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To support the goals of expanding our human presence and current economic sphere 
beyond LEO, a new plan was constructed for NASA to enter into partnerships with industry 
to foster and incentivize a new era of lunar industrialization. For NASA to finally be 
successful in achieving sustainable human exploration missions beyond LEO, lessons learned 
from our space history have shown that it is essential for current program planning to 
include affordable and economic development goals as well as address top national priorities 
to obtain much needed public support. In the last 58 years of NASA’s existence, only 
Apollo’s human exploration missions beyond LEO were successful since it was proclaimed to 
be a top national priority during the 1960’s. However, the missions were not sustainable and 
ended abruptly in 1972 due to lack of funding and insufficient economic gain. Ever since 
Apollo, there have not been any human missions beyond LEO because none of the proposed 
program plans were economical or proclaimed a top national priority. The proposed plan 
outlines a new campaign of low-cost, commercial-enabled lunar COTS (Commercial Orbital 
Transfer Services) missions which is an update to the Lunar COTS plan previously 
described. The objectives of this new campaign of missions are to prospect for resources, 
determine the economic viability of extracting those resources and assess the value 
proposition of using these resources in future exploration architectures such as Mars. These 
missions would be accomplished in partnership with commercial industry using the well-
proven COTS Program acquisition model. This model proved to be very beneficial to both 
NASA and its industry partners as NASA saved significantly in development and 
operational costs, as much as tenfold, while industry partners successfully expanded their 
market share and demonstrated substantial economic gain. Similar to COTS, the goals for 
this new initiative are 1) to develop and demonstrate cost-effective, cis-lunar commercial 
services, such as lunar transportation, lunar mining and lunar ISRU operations; 2) enable 
development of an affordable and economical exploration architecture for future missions to 
Mars and beyond; and 3) to incentivize the creation of new lunar markets through use of 
lunar resources for economic benefit to NASA, commercial industry and the international 
community. These cost-effective services would not only enable NASA to economically and 
sustainably achieve its human exploration missions to the Moon, Mars and beyond but it 
would also kickstart a new era of lunar industrialization. This paper will describe the goals, 
objectives and approach for implementing this new campaign of missions. It will also 
describe the potential benefits and progress that can be accomplished with these low-cost, 
Lunar COTS missions. Lastly, a preliminary economic analysis approach is proposed for 
understanding the cost and potential return on investment in the use of lunar resources to 
reach the goal of lunar industrialization and an expanded and sustainable human presence 
into cis-lunar space and beyond. 
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ACES = Advanced Cryogenic Evolved Stage 
COTS = Commercial Orbital Transportation Services 
CRS = Commercial Resupply Services 
EDL = Entry Descent and Landing 
ELA = Evolvable Lunar Architecture 
EMC = Evolvable Mars Campaign 
FAR = Federal Acquisition Regulations 
FT = Full Thrust 
FY = Fiscal Year 
GER = Global Exploration Roadmap 
GLXP = Google Lunar XPRIZE 
GTO = Geostationary Transfer Orbit 
HEOMD = Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 
HSF = Human Space Flight 
ISRU = In-Situ Resource Utilization 
ISS = International Space Station 
IVF = Integrated Vehicle Fluids 
JSC = Johnson Space Center 
LCOTS = Lunar Commercial Orbital Transfer Services 
LCROSS = Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite 
LEO =    Low-Earth Orbit 
LH2 = Liquid Hydrogen 
LLO = Low Lunar Orbit 
LOI = Lunar Orbit Insertion 
LO2 = Liquid Oxygen 
LRO = Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
mt = Metric ton 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NRC = National Research Council 
PSR = Permanently Shadowed Region 
ROI = Return On Investment 
SAA =  Space Act Agreement 
SLS = Space Launch System 
STG = Space Task Group 
TEI = Trans-Earth Injection 
TLI = Trans-Lunar Injection 
ULA = United Launch Alliance 
VSE =  Vision for Space Explortion 
I. Introduction 
N May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy addressed a special joint session in Congress to announce his 
ambitious goal of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to Earth before the end of the decade. 
At the time, the U.S. was in the middle of a Cold War with the Soviet Union and found itself falling behind in the 
“space race” with the recent launch of Soviet cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin, first man to orbit the Earth on April 12, 
1961. This geo-political environment threatened our national security which drove Kennedy to set this ambitious 
goal to ensure the U.S. would win the space race and demonstrate U.S. technical superiority to the rest of the world. 
As described by aerospace historian, Roger Lanius1, “By any unit of measure the U.S. had not demonstrated 
technical equality with the Soviet Union, and that fact worried national leaders because of what it would mean in the 
larger Cold War environment. These apparent disparities in technical competence had to be addressed and Kennedy 
had to find a way to reestablish the nation’s credibility as a technological leader before the world.” In retrospect, this 
unique confluence of factors in 1961 made it possible for Kennedy to make such a bold decision to direct NASA to 
land a man on the Moon expeditiously which was met with immediate and overwhelming support by Congress and 
the American public. 
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 Kennedy also made it clear that his Moon landing goal was a national priority as stated in a private meeting with  
the NASA Administrator, James Webb, and others on November 21, 1962. As stated by Dr. Robert Seamans, NASA 
Deputy Administrator, who was also present at the meeting, “The President’s bottom line was absolutely clear. He 
stated that Apollo was NASA’s top priority, important for international and political reasons. He added that except 
for defense, it was, along with one other, the top priority of the U.S. government.2” This declaration gave Webb the 
ammunition needed to secure the appropriate funding and resources needed to accomplish the Apollo Moon landing 
long after Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.  As a result, NASA’s annual budget increased from $500M in 1960 to 
a high point of $5.2B in 1965 (or $29B in 2009 constant year dollars3) with the overall Apollo program costing 
$129.5B (2009 constant year dollars) from 1961 to 1972. This abundant level of resources authorized by Congress 
ultimately led NASA to accomplish one of the greatest human technological achievements of the 20th century on 
July 20, 1969, by landing men on the Moon for the first time in human history.  
 Since the end of the Apollo program, the overall NASA budget has steadily decreased from it’s peak of 4.5% of 
the federal budget in 1965 to approximately 0.5% over the last decade and where it remains today. During this 
steady decline, there have been several attempts to pursue follow-on human exploration programs beyond LEO but 
all have unfortunately failed or not even started due to insufficient funds. In 1969, President Nixon directed the 
Space Task Group (STG) to develop architecture options and recommendations for a post-Apollo strategy. The STG 
delivered a report4 proposing three different options which included a fully-functional manned lunar base and a 
human mission to Mars before the end of the century. The funding for these options required significant increases to 
NASA’s budget which varied from $30B to approximately $50B (FY2014) per year to accomplish these missions. 
For a variety of political reasons and funding limitations, Nixon decided not to pursue any of these options. Instead, 
Nixon decided to proceed with the development of a reusable space shuttle system with the goal of flying 50 
missions per year to drive down space transportation costs. As a result the Space Shuttle Program was initiated in 
1972 and was the main focus of NASA’s workforce and resources for the next decade. 
 After the first launch of the Space Shuttle in 1981, there was renewed interest at NASA once again to return to 
the Moon and develop plans for lunar exploration missions and lunar base development. NASA Johnson Space 
Center (JSC) took the lead in this endeavor developing engineering studies and holding scientific meetings. This 
resulted in a special report, Lunar Outpost5, released by the Advanced Programs Office of NASA JSC detailing 
planning activities to return humans to the Moon. Then in July 1989, President George H.W. Bush publicly 
announced the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) which was a new initiative and executive commitment to return to 
the Moon and on to Mars. Inspired by the 20th anniversary of the first landing of men on the Moon, President Bush 
gave a speech and declared the following: 
 “First, for the coming decade, for the 1990s, Space Station Freedom, our critical next step in all our space 
endeavors. And next, for the next century, back to the Moon, back to the future, and this time, back to stay. And then 
a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet, a manned mission to Mars.6” 
 Following this declaration, NASA created a task force to determine the requirements and make 
recommendations to fulfill this Initiative. This resulted in the following document, “Report on the 90-Day Study on 
Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars6.” Among the findings of this report, the projected total cost of the 
proposed lunar and Mars projects, over 34 years, was estimated at $541B (in 1991 dollars) or $983B (in 2014 
dollars). As a consequence of this exorbitant price tag, Congress zeroed the budget of the SEI as quickly as it was 
received. However, the newly re-named International Space Station (ISS) continued to be funded and was the focus 
of NASA’s resources and workforce for the next decade. The initial assembly of the first two ISS modules, Russian 
Zarya module, and U.S. Unity module took place in December 1998. 
 Later in 2004, President George W. Bush announced a new policy entitled, the Vision for Space Exploration7, 
(VSE) which outlined goals for human and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. These specific goals 
included 1) complete the International Space Station by 2010; 2) phase out the Space Shuttle after completion of the 
ISS; 3) launch a robotic orbiter and lander to the Moon; 4) send a human expedition to the Moon as early as 2015, 
but no later than 2020; and 5) conduct robotic missions to Mars in preparation for a future human expedition. The 
President went further on to explain his new policy and vision by stating the following, “the fundamental goal of this 
vision is to advance U.S. scientific, security and economic interests through a robust space exploration program.7”  
 In 2005, the NASA Administrator, Dr. Michael Griffin, established a new team to evaluate hundreds of potential 
configurations to meet the goals of the VSE under the newly formed Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
(ESAS). Another major objective for the team was to minimize the gap between the last Shuttle flight (planned for 
2010) and the first flight of the new vehicle. The results of this study resulted in an architecture that was adopted by 
the newly formed Constellation Program. These architecture elements included the heavy-lift launch vehicle, Ares 
V, separate booster to launch the crew, Ares I, the Crew Exploration Vehicle, (CEV) and the Altair lunar lander.  
 




 Although Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration consisted of well-established goals, its Constellation program 
required a significant increase in NASA’s yearly human spaceflight budget, ranging from $3B per year in FY2008 
to $9B per year in FY2012. Some estimates also showed that the total cost for a human return to the Moon by 2020 
reached in excess of $100B. Therefore, after President Obama took office in 2009, he called for an independent 
review of the current human spaceflight plans. This review was led by Norman R. Augustine and a distinguished 
committee who reviewed the Constellation Program and its supporting programs. After months of review, this 
committee concluded that the current program of record was on an unsustainable trajectory and that its goals did not 
match the allocated resources as was reported in reference 3. As a result of these findings, Obama decided to cancel 
the Constellation program in February 2010. 
It is also worth noting that the Augustine committee concluded that "the ultimate goal of human exploration is to 
chart a path for human expansion into the solar system3" and that "human spaceflight objectives should broadly 
align with key national objectives.3" They also went on to conclude that three basic objectives should be met in 
order to achieve the ultimate goal for human space flight which include: (1) physical sustainability (2) economic 
sustainability and (3) meet key national objectives. These national objectives may include national security, 
international cooperation, economic growth and secutiry, energy independence, reducing climate change, etc.  
 After the Augustine committee delivered its report, Obama established a new National Space Policy8 of 2010 
which set the goals for NASA to send humans to an asteroid by 2025 and on to orbit Mars by the mid-2030’s. To 
accomplish these goals, NASA established the Exploration Enterprise and released its plans in its Journey to Mars9 
document. In this plan, it describes its goal as “NASA aims to extend human presence deeper into the solar system 
and to the surface of Mars.” It also describes its plan including NASA’s development of a heavy-lift launch vehicle 
defined as the Space Launch System (SLS) and a human–rated spacecraft named Orion. NASA has also initiated an 
Evolvable Mars Campaign10 (EMC) to investigate architectures and conduct trade studies to define the additional 
capabilities and elements needed for a sustainable human presence on the surface of Mars. Under the EMC, NASA 
has also developed a Pioneering Space Strategy11 with the objective of creating a sustainable human to Mars 
program which is described as “one that expands human presence into the solar system in a manner that is affordable 
and permanent.” It should be noted that this strategy is very well aligned with the Augustine committee 
recommendations as previously cited. Furthermore this strategy is guided by a set of key strategic principles to 
achieve a sustainable, affordable space program. These principles, as listed in reference 11, include: 
• Implementable in the near-term with the buying power of current budgets and in the longer term with 
budgets commensurate with economic growth;  
• Exploration enables science and science enables exploration, leveraging robotic expertise for human 
exploration of the solar system  
• Application of high Technology Readiness Level (TRL) technologies for near term missions, while 
focusing sustained investments on technologies and capabilities to address challenges of future missions;  
• Near-term mission opportunities with a defined cadence of compelling and integrated human and robotic 
missions providing for an incremental buildup of capabilities for more complex missions over time;  
• Opportunities for U.S. commercial business to further enhance the experience and business base;  
• Multi-use, evolvable space infrastructure, minimizing unique major developments, with each mission 
leaving something behind to support subsequent missions; and  
• Substantial new international and commercial partnerships, leveraging the current International Space 
Station partnership while building new cooperative ventures.  
 In staying aligned with these key strategic principles of EMC and the goals of Journey to Mars, this paper lays 
out a plan to initiate a campaign of low-cost, commercial-enabled lunar missions to prospect and extract lunar 
resources with the vision to ultimately achieve a sustainable and economical human exploration program beyond 
LEO. As the Journey to Mars states in its Proving Ground objectives, it is important to “understand the nature and 
distribution of volatiles and extraction techniques, and decide on their potential use in the human exploration 
architecture.8” In the following section, the plan for prospecting and extracting resources is described which should 
meet this objective. 
 In addition, from the lessons of the last 47 years of proposed human exploration plans since the first Apollo 
landing, we have learned that in order for future exploration programs to be successful they must be economically 
sustainable and meet key national priorities to obtain the Administration, Congressional and public support needed 
through the life of the program(s) which may be several decades long. Unfortunately, history has shown that 
proposed exploration programs that do not meet this criteria will ultimately fail to accomplish its goals. Although 
Apollo was hugely successful, it was an anomaly in that a unique confluence of factors came together at the perfect 
 




time making it a top national priority without having to be economically sustainable. Regrettably, the Apollo model 
set a bad precedent by giving NASA an unrealistic expectation that it would always obtain a huge increase in budget 
without having to include plans for economic development and sustainability. It is clear now that the conditions that 
made Apollo successful were unique to that era and will more than likely never occur again. After nearly 50 years of 
failed program planning without being able to send humans beyond LEO again, it is very clear that a new 
framework for program planning is needed, one that is focused on economic sustainability and meeting national 
priorities, for current and future human exploration programs to succeed. The following section will describe this 
new “Space Development” framework to help with current and future program planning. 
  In summary, the proposed initiative was developed in alignment with this new framework as well as the Journey 
to Mars goals and objectives and EMC’s key strategic principles as just discussed. This new initiative proposes a 
new campaign of low-cost, commercial-enabled lunar exploration missions to prospect for lunar resources, 
determine the economic viability of extracting those resources and assess if those resources can enable NASA to 
develop an affordable and economical exploration architecture for human missions to Mars and beyond. As the 
Journey to Mars plan suggests, it is worthwhile to investigate the resources of the Moon to determine if its resources 
can be economically extracted and affordably utilized in a future Mars transportation architecture. The following 
sections describe the new framework for human exploration planning and an updated Lunar COTS plan that could 
lead to lunar industrialization and an economically sustainable human exploration program to meet the ultimate goal 
of human expansion into the Solar System. 
II. Update to the Lunar COTS Plan 
Last year, the Lunar COTS plan was described in detail in an AIAA publication by the same principle authors 
entitled, “Lunar COTS: An Economical and Sustainable Approach to Reaching Mars.12” The term COTS came from 
NASA Johnson Space Center’s program entitled, Commercial Orbital Transportation Services13, which was very 
successful in developing and demonstrating cargo delivery capabilities to the ISS in partnership with industry. It was 
planned together with the ISS Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contracts which awarded SpaceX and Orbital 
Sciences Corp. (now known as Orbital ATK) in 2008 to resupply the ISS on a regular basis with unpressurized and 
pressurized cargo. As a result of the COTS and CRS programs, 2 new launch vehicles and spacecraft were 
developed and have been successfully servicing the ISS program since 2012 with cargo transportation missions: 
1)SpaceX’s Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon spacecraft; and 2)Orbital’s Antares launch vehicle and Cygnus 
spacecraft. Recent studies have shown that government funding investments provided less than one half of the cost 
for these two commercial transportation systems13(47% government funding for SpaceX and 42% government 
funding for Orbital). Also it has been estimated that the final development cost for SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket was 
about $400M which is approximately 10 times less than projected costs for the same rocket using traditional cost-
plus contracting methods.14 
Earlier this year another round of ISS CRS contracts were announced awarding SpaceX, Orbital ATK and Sierra 
Nevada Corporation for more cargo delivery services to and from ISS from 2019 through 2024. Another extension 
of COTS is NASA’s Commercial Crew Program which was originally planned as an option in the original COTS 
solicitation of 2006. This program has been making significant progress in reaching its goal of achieving safe, 
reliable and cost-effective commercial human transportation services to ISS and LEO in partnership with industry. 
In September 2014, the Commercial Crew Program awarded two industry teams, SpaceX and Boeing, to complete 
development of a human space transportation capability for eventual launch of astronauts to the ISS. From the early 
planning of COTS/CRS programs to today’s routine commercial cargo delivery services to tomorrow’s commercial 
human transportation flights to LEO, these programs have truly revolutioned the aerospace industry by expanding 
the commercial space markets in LEO and lowering the space transportation costs for the entire world market.  
To continue on this successful path towards commercializing LEO and beyond, the principle authors, who 
supported the formulation of the original COTS program in 2005-06, initiated a study last year to extend the COTS 
acquisition model to cis-lunar space called Lunar Commercial Orbital Transfer Services (or LCOTS). The findings 
of this initial study as well as the COTS acquisition model was described in detail in reference 12. In summary, this 
LCOTS plan described a three-phase approach to develop and demonstrate cis-lunar capabilities and services by 
partnering with industry to share cost and risk for mutual benefit. The goals of the LCOTS plan are listed below:  
1) Establish affordable and economical cis-lunar commercial products and services. 
2) Enable development of a sustainable and economical exploration architecture for future missions to Mars 
and beyond. 
3) Encourage creation of new markets in cis-lunar space for economic growth and benefit.  
 





The LCOTS plan included use of the COTS acquisition model which utilized a new progressive approach than 
FAR-based contracts normally used in traditional procurement practices. This new model employed Space Act 
Agreements (SAA’s) where NASA entered into partnerships with industry for mutual benefit. The best practices of 
this COTS model were fully described in reference 12 and are summarized in the following for the reader: 
1) NASA and commercial partners share cost, development and operational risk to demonstrate new 
capabilities and services for mutual benefit.  
2) NASA makes long-term commitments to procure commercial services to help secure private investments. 
3) NASA encourages commercial partners to target space markets outside Government to make their 
business case close. NASA is anchor customer but not sole customer. 
4) NASA uses SAA’s to enter into partnership with commercial partners to offer maximum flexibility in 
design solutions without the full demands and requirements of typical FAR-based contracts. 
5) NASA includes pay-on-performance milestones in SAA’s to provide several off-ramps and reduce 
programmatic risk. 
6) Commercial partners retain Intellectual Property (IP) rights and operates and owns final product(s). 
 
As mentioned, the LCOTS plan included a three-phase approach to allow for incremental development and 
demonstration of cis-lunar capabilities. This was described as a lower-risk approach since it allowed for several off-
ramps to the program at the end of each phase and time for pause between phases to make sure its milestones and 





An update to the LCOTS plan was made to include the lessons learned from the past 58 years of NASA’s history 
as was discussed in the previous section. It was discussed that an economically-sustainable plan is needed for a long-
term human exploration program to send humans beyond LEO to finally succeed. This concept was further explored 
and investigated which lead to the Space Development Framework shown in Figure 1.  This framework presents 
three different phases in space development leading towards the ultimate goal of sustainable settlement. 
A. Description of Space Development Framework 
These three phases are defined as Space Exploration, Economic Development and Sustainable Settlement. The 
first phase is focused on meeting objectives for space exploration, science and discovery. This phase is very 
important to acquire new knowledge and an understanding of the space environment and its challenges for future 
space explorers and pioneers. Figure 1 illustrates an example list of NASA missions under this first phase which are 
typically developed and operated with nearly 100% of government resources and control as shown by the red line in 
the figure. Figure 1 also illustrates 4 different space regions defined as Low-Earth Orbit, Cis-Lunar Space, Mars and 
its Moons and Beyond Mars. The NASA missions listed under Space Exploration are not meant to be all-inclusive.  
 





Figure 1. Space Development Framework 
 
These are just a small sampling of missions to illustrate the point that most NASA missions have been mainly 
focused on meeting space exploration and science objectives and not yet moved into the next phase of Economic 
Development. 
The second phase, Economic Development, is defined as the phase where the missions are focused primarily on 
spurring economic growth in space and providing economic benefit to the space community. It is essential for the 
missions in this phase to be planned to include achievable economic development goals and metrics. These goals 
can range from establishing more commercial services and products in space to creating and expanding space 
markets to increasing the number of people living and working in space which all result in growing the space 
economy. As figure 1 illustrates by the red line, the amount of government resources and control decline to a range 
between 75% to 25% in this phase. This is a transitional phase where a reduction in government control and 
ownership over space missions is needed while at the same time an increase in commercial development is 
encouraged and incentivized. The balance of these 2 forces, if done correctly, will create a favorable environment 
for a space economy to grow. The role of government in this phase should focus more on building an infrastructure 
to help foster economic development and look for ways to encourage and incentivize industry to take the lead and 
risk for conducting space missions and innovating new space products and services.  
A good example of programs in the Economic Development phase were the COTS, CRS and Commercial Crew 
programs. These programs were created to meet economic development goals from their inception. The objectives 
for these programs, from the beginning, were to create partnerships with industry to develop capabilities, such as 
cargo and crew transportation, that can later be offered as services at a competitive price to NASA and the rest of the 
space community. The motivation behind setting these early objectives were to grow the space economy, 
significantly reduce the cost of space transportation and increase access to space to benefit everyone.  
Equally as important to the economic development goals of this phase is the concerted effort for NASA’s 
missions in partnership with industry to meet key national objectives in this phase as well, such as, national security, 
economic security, energy independence, climate change, etc. As discussed in the last section, Augustine’s 
committee3 recommended this objective of meeting national objectives as well to help our country solve critical 
national problems by using the resources of space and to acquire long-term Congressional and public support. Key 
to the success of our long-term human space exploration planning will be showing relevance to our national leaders 
and private citizens at home. To meet these objectives, it will be necessary to design missions to acquire resources, 
test new technologies, and develop new capabilities in partnership with industry to solve some of our nation’s 
greatest challenges.  
 In summary, there will be many benefits to conducting more missions in the Economic Development phase. It 
will not only lead to a larger and stronger space economy but it will also lead to a gradual transition into the last 
phase of this framework which is Sustainable Settlement. As can be seen from Figure 1, there are no missions listed 
under the category of Sustainable Settlement. That is because we are still far away from entering this last phase. As 
 




history has shown, it normally takes a long period of time to develop the infrastructure needed for economic 
development to flourish in a certain region before sustainable settlement can take place.  
 
B. Update to Phase I: Campaign of Low-Cost, Commercial-Enabled Missions 
Phase I was introduced in reference 12. It has now been updated to include economic development goals as well 
as a campaign of low-cost, commercial-enabled lunar exploration missions in partnership with industry to explore 
lunar resources. It is important to include economic goals right at the outset of LCOTS to ensure this program will 
be affordable and sustainable and will aim to grow the space economy as previously discussed. Below is a proposed 
list of goals for Phase I: 
1. Conduct a campaign of low-cost, commercial-enabled lunar exploration missions to prospect and 
extract lunar resources to meet NASA’s mission needs and industry’s commercial interests; 
2. Determine the economic viability of extracting resources by testing various commercial tools, products 
and techniques in a lunar environment; 
3. Build an economic infrastructure by partnering with industry to place in service power stations, lunar 
communication relay satellites, and lunar surface communication systems; 
4. Enable a robust cis-lunar commercial economy by incentivizing industry to create new space products 
and markets; 
5. Inspire the next generation of space entrepreneurs by conducting several educational and outreach 
activities. 
To achieve these goals, it will be necessary to partner with industry using a COTS-like approach as previously 
described to prospect and extract lunar resources. As discussed in reference 12, there are a wide variety of lunar 
resources in the lunar regolith that can be useful to NASA’s long-term human exploration missions to Mars and 
beyond. One major example is water-ice concentrations in the permanently shadowed regions of the lunar poles. 
Several remote-sensing, lunar missions in the last two decades including DOD’s and NASA’s Clementine15 mission 
launched in 1994; NASA’s Lunar Prospector mission launched in 1998; NASA’s Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter16 
(LRO) launched in 2009 and NASA’s Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite17 (LCROSS) mission 
launched in 2009 have all indicated the presence of water-ice deposits at the lunar poles.  Furthermore, it has been 
estimated that the total quantity of water contained within the uppermost meter of all the PSRs may be 2.9x1012 kg 
(or 2900 million mt of water)18. Although these data are strong indications that the presence of water-ice is plentiful 
at the poles, ground truth data is needed to validate these results and determine the composition, distribution, and 
accessibility of these areas with high concentrations of lunar ice. 
Several studies19,20,21 have also shown that extracting these resources, such as water and oxygen, can be readily 
accomplished. In addition Miller and Spudis have examined the ISRU processes and facilities necessary to extract 
and convert the water into LO2 and LH2 propellants and have provided cost estimates for putting the infrastructure 
in place for creating the propellant and then delivering it to a cis-lunar propellant depot for use in a future Mars 
architecture. Although these studies have provided an excellent strategy and approach for creating propellant on the 
lunar surface, ground truth data from the Moon is needed to determine the exact methods, tools and machinery 
needed to extract the lunar ice and create the propellant for a more refined cost estimate. It is also best to obtain this 
ground truth data and develop extraction techniques in partnership with industry to share cost and risk as well as 
leverage on industry’s capabilities and innovativeness in a competitive environment employing the COTS 
acquisition model. As mentioned previously, the original COTS program saved immensely in development costs, as 
much as tenfold, where total government funding totaled less than one-half of total investments made in a new space 
transportation system. Therefore, the goals of this first phase emphasize launching a campaign of low-cost, 
commercial-enabled missions in partnership with industry to prospect for resources and determine the economic 
viability of extracting these resources using commercial methods. 
The authors recommend a campaign of missions instead of a single, large mission for this first phase. Prior to the 
Apollo missions, several pre-cursor missions including Ranger, Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor were executed using  
several campaigns. A campaign is advantageous over a single, large mission because you have several attempts to 
accomplish your mission objectives which increases your likelihood of mission success while lowering your risk 
posture on every successive mission. It also reduces cost per mission by taking advantage of economies of scale. A 
campaign will also provide data at multiple sites which expands your landing options to prospect for resources. The 
Ranger program opted to use a campaign and flew 9 missions from 1961 to 64. These missions were designed to 
take images of the lunar surface until impact to acquire knowledge of potential landing sites in preparation for the 
Apollo missions. The first 6 missions failed and the last 3 missions performed successfully. Similarly, the Surveyor 
 




program conducted a campaign of missions from 1966-68 were 5 of 7 missions landed successfully and achieved its 
mission objectives of evaluating the suitability of landing sites for the Apollo missions. 
It is also recommended that substantial information be exchanged between NASA and its potential industry 
partners in the early stages to learn and understand industry’s commercial interests to determine where these 
interests overlap and how best to develop capabilities that can best serve these common interests, such as lunar 
transportation and lunar mining. It is also important to learn and understand the maturity level of industry’s 
capabilities, their readiness level and potential business plans.  As with the original COTS program, this should be 
done prior to the formulation phase through industry one-on-one interviews and workshops. The results of these 
information exchanges will help shape this first phase by setting objectives and milestones that are achievable as 
well as a realistic and in building effective partnerships that seek to accomplish low-cost missions for mutual 
benefit. 
Through these information exchanges, it will also be important for industry to learn and understand NASA’s 
intentions and plans for mission objectives, frequency of lunar missions, infrastructure development, and payload 
requirements. As mentioned in the COTS best practices section, it is essential for NASA to make clear its long-term 
commitments for acquiring lunar commercial services to help its potential partners raise private capital. 
Another important tactic used in the COTS solicitation was to request for the commercial space providers to 
include feasible and economical business plans in their proposals. It was recommended that the providers target 
markets outside of NASA and not solely rely on the government to close their business case. This tactic was used to 
encourage the providers to develop low-cost capabilities to capture new markets, expand their customer base and 
create new industries to further commercialize LEO space. Similarly, this tactic should be used in the first phase of 
Lunar COTS to initiate commercialization of cis-lunar space. 
C. Partnership Strategy 
The partnership strategy is a key aspect to the first phase in establishing cost-effective partnerships in several 
different capability areas including launch vehicles, lunar landers, lunar rovers, resource prospecting, power stations, 
communications and extraction equipment. It is important to determine which capabilities can be developed in 
partnership with industry using a COTS acquisition model and which ones will need to be acquired by other means 
such as a more traditional FAR-based approach. The Lunar COTS paper described an assessment tool for evaluating 
these industry capabilities against several criteria. These criteria included: 1) number of viable companies with 
enough technical and financial capability and strong interest to pursue LCOTS opportunity; 2) size of potential 
markets likely to emerge within 5 years to attract private investors; 3) level of affordability to fully develop 
capability within realistic budgets from NASA and private capital from industry; 4) strong potential for positive 
return on investment based on sound business plans; and 5) strong potential to reduce technical, cost or operational 
risk towards a Mars architecture. An initial preliminary assessment for the lunar capabilities was made in reference 
12. This assessment is only valid for the period of time it was made. The assessment will need to be conducted again 
during the formulation phase of the first phase to make sure it is accurate and current. In the meantime, it is 
important to keep track of industry’s progress for the range of capabilities needed for Phase 1. The following 
describes industry’s capabilities for each of the elements needed for Phase 1.  
The launch vehicle is an essential element of the partnership strategy. To keep costs low during the first phase, it 
is critical to identify available low-cost, secondary payload opportunities on medium-class, commercial launch 
vehicles. Table 1 below lists several domestic options for existing and future launch vehicles along with their 
estimated payload capacities to various destinations. For existing launch vehicles, United Launch Alliance’s (ULA) 
Atlas V and SpaceX’s Falcon 9 provide similar payload capacities with Atlas V being slightly greater to GTO and 
beyond. However, Falcon 9 Full Thrust (FT) capability was recently upgraded with 30% higher capability than its 
previous Falcon 9 v1.1 vehicle23. This increase was not taken into account when estimating its payload capacity to 
the lunar surface as shown in the table. These estimates were not intended to be exact but to provide a rough 
estimate of the payload mass that can be delivered to various destinations including the lunar surface. The table 
shows that both the Atlas V and Falcon 9 are capable of delivering approximately 1 mt to the lunar surface. As will 
be discussed in the following sub-section, this existing capability is sufficient for delivering small lunar landers and 
rovers to the lunar surface. 
Table 1 also provides estimates for new launch vehicles being developed, including ULA’s Vulcan and 
SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy. Although these launch vehicles are not yet in operation, they are being planned to be active 
in the very near future, Falcon Heavy by 2017, Vulcan Centaur by 2019 and Vulcan ACES by 2023. Table 1 shows 
significant increase in capability for both new vehicles with lunar landed mass capability increasing from 
approximately 1 mt to 4 mt for both vehicles. In addition, Vulcan’s capability significantly increases by 
approximately a factor of 3 to the lunar surface (from approximately 4 to 12 mt) using a distributed launch concept 
 




described by Kutter24 et al of ULA where multiple launches are used to deliver cryogenic propellant in a separate 
drop tank and then transferring the propellant directly into a cargo-carrying upper stage, such as Centaur.  
There are several options for identifying secondary payload opportunities on these existing launch vehicles. One 
option is working directly with the launch service providers, such as, ULA’s rideshare program to identify excess 
capacity on one of their missions. Another option may be to employ a company, such as Spaceflightvi Inc., who 
specializes in finding low-cost, secondary payload opportunities for small payloads by finding excess capacity in 
commercial launch vehicles and integrating all of the payloads as one discrete unit to the launch vehicle. This 
business model provides an important integration function and offers the launch services at a less expensive rate to 
reach orbit compared to buying an entire launch vehicle. Using this business model or directly working with the 
launch service provider may yield good results in acquiring a launch for a small payload (<1 mt) at a competitive 
rate. 












Atlas 551 or 55222 21 9 6.1 0.8 – 1.3ref.23  
Falcon 9 FT24 22.8 8.3 3.6 – 5vii 0.5-0.93ref.23 
Vulcan Centaur24 22 11 7.5 TBD 




N/A N/A 30 12 
Falcon Heavyix 
(fully expendable) 
54.4 22.2 13 ref.24 2.5 – 4.53ref.23  
 
A lunar transportation system or lunar lander is another important capability to develop using the COTS model 
in the first phase. For this phase, the lunar lander can be modest in size with mass ranging approximately from 200 
kg to 800 kg to fit within the existing launch vehicles as secondary payloads as listed in Table 1. It will be 
advantageous to leverage off the successful programs already in place that are incentivizing the development of 
lunar landers, such as, the Google Lunar XPRIZE (GLXP) and Lunar CATALYST programs.  
NASA’s Lunar Cargo Transportation and Landing by Soft Touchdown (CATALYST) Program is sponsored by 
NASA Headquarter’s Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD). The purpose of the Lunar 
CATALYST  program is to encourage the development of robotic lunar landers that can be integrated with 
commercial launch vehicles to deliver payloads to the lunar surface. In 2014, this program awarded un-funded Space 
Act Agreements to 3 domestic companies, including Astrobotic, Moon Express and Masten Space Systems, to 
develop lunar transportation systems. These companies have made considerable progress and are listed in Table 2 
along with other teams competing for the Google Lunar XPRIZE. 
The XPRIZE was initiated in 2007 by Google to encourage and incentivize space entrepreneurs from around the 
world to compete in a global competition to develop, build and operate lunar transportation systems. The 
competition offers $30M in prizes including $20M Grand Prize to the first team that successfully lands on the Moon, 
traverses 500 meters and transmits high definition images and video back to Earth. Although the teams must use 
mainly private funds (90%) to develop their systems, the guidelines do allow for governments to provide or 
purchase services from the teams at fair market value. Table 2 lists several of these GLXP lunar lander teams which 
have made significant progress. In addition, two of these teams, Moon Express and SpaceIL, have confirmed and 
                                                            
vi http://www.spaceflight.com/launch/ 








verified launch agreements as shown in Table 2. Most of these lunar lander teams will continue to be in business to 
deliver payloads to the Moon, long after the GLXP prize has been awarded. As an example, Astrobotic is aiming to 
become a lunar payload delivery service through a shared ride strategy. They are currently advertising to deliver 
payloads to the lunar surface at a cost of $1.2M/kgx. Germany’s Part-Time Scientists in partnership with Audi are 
also offering delivery services to the Moon. Their website is advertising a cost of 700K to 800K Euros per kilogram 
to the lunar surface.  If these and other lunar payload delivery services come to fruition, they will provide an 
opportunity to NASA and other organizations to acquire low-cost transportation to the lunar surface. 
Although several of these GLXP teams are owned by foreign organizations, NASA may still be able to acquire 
these lunar transportation services through arrangements with the State Department which may include bartering 
instead of exchange of funds. 
Table 2 also includes ULA’s XEUS26 lander which is derived from ULA’s new upper stage named Advanced 
Cryogenic Evolved Stage (ACES).27 The ACES stage is described as a large LO2/LH2 upper stage, about 3 times 
the size of Centaur, and integrates an innovative Integrated Vehicle Fluids (IVF) technology. Although it plans to 
outperform existing Delta Cryogenic Second Stage (DCSS) and Centaur upper stages, it plans to be built for the 
same or less recurring cost than Centaur which makes it very attractive. Also the IVF subsystem is an auxiliary 
power unit that runs solely on LO2 and LH2 eliminating the need for main vehicle batteries and helium bottles for 
tank pressurization. This technology enables ACES to be a fully reusable and long duration in-space stage that can 
be refueled with LO2 and LH2 which can be supplied from resources found on the Moon. Sowers28 describes this 
system as the cornerstone to ULA’s visionary Cislunar 1000 transportation system that plans to cycle back and forth 
between LEO and cis-lunar space powered solely by the resources of the Moon. In addition, their plan describes a 
transformation kit including thrusters, avionics and landing legs to be added to ACES to transform it into a lunar 
lander called XEUS. This lander will also be fully reusable and powered by IVF using solely LO2/LH2 propellant. 
Although this lander may be too large and costly for first phase, it is an excellent candidate for inclusion in second 
phase of LCOTS where the objective is to perform a pilot demonstration of ISRU resource production. 
     Table 2. Potential Lunar Landers 
Lunar Lander Teams Targeted First Mission and Capabilities 
Astrobotic’sxi GLXP Team -
Peregrine Lander 
Planned for launch in late 2017 to Lacus Mortis (45 deg N and 
25 deg E). Peregrine capabilitiy ranges from 35 kg on first 
mission to 265 kg to lunar surface.  
Moon Expressxi GLXP 
Team 
Signed launch agreement with RocketLab’s Electron Launch 
Vehicle for 3 lunar missions from 2017 to 2020. 
Masten Space Systemsxii Launch is TBD. Landers in development include Xaero, Xoie, 
Xombie and XEUS. 
Israel’s SpaceILxiii GLXP 
team 
Signed launch agreement via SpaceFlight with SpaceX’s 
Falcon 9 for a late 2017 launch. 
Germany’s Part-Time 
Scientistsxiv GLXP team 
Planned for launch in 2017 to Apollo 17 landing site (Taurus-
Littrow Valley). 
ULA’s XEUS, ACES 
derived Lander 
Planned for launch early next decade on ULA’s Vulcan launch 
vehicle. Lander capability is approx 3.8 mT to lunar surface for 
single launch and much greater using distributed launch. 
Lunar Rovers are another an important capability to develop using the COTS model in the first phase. These 
rovers should be able to traverse long distances on the Moon carrying essential instruments that can identify key 
resources, such as hydrogen concentrations in water-ice deposits. These rovers should also be rugged enough to be 
able to navigate across rough, rocky and steep terrain as well as durable enough to withstand the extreme 
temperatures found on the Moon. The rovers must also be able to operate autonomously with limited command from 











the ground. Table 3 provides a list of potential lunar rovers that are being developed specifically to operate on the 
Moon to prospect for resources. All of these rovers are currently being developed for the GLXP competition. 
Similar to the lunar lander teams, some of these teams are planning to continue their rover business on the Moon 
long after the GLXP competition is over. Astrobotic/CMU is presently advertising $2M/kg for delivery of payloads 
on their lunar rovers. Ispace Technologies business plan consists of mapping valuable resources on the Moon to 
determine economic value of resources and providing services to collect, store and deliver these valuable resources. 
These rover teams offer a great opportunity for partnership and delivery services to carry essential prospecting 
instruments on the lunar surface at various sites to meet the objectives of the first phase. 
 
   Table 3. Potential Lunar Rovers 
Lunar Rover Teams Capabilities 
Astrobotic/Carnegie Mellonxv 
University (CMU) GLXP Team  
Multiple rover options including Andy 
rover for first mission and Polar rover with 
excavation and planetary cave exploration 
capabilities. 
iSpace Technologiesxvi operates 
Japan’s Hakuto GLXP Team 
Multiple rover options for resource 
prospecting and tethered rovers to explore 
polar craters and caves. 
Chile’s AngelicvMxvii GLXP Team The Unity Rover plans to deliver small 
payloads on first and follow-on missions. 
Germany’s Part-Time Scientistsxviii 
GLXP team partnered with Audi  
The Audi Lunar Quattro is equipped with a 
4-wheeled electrical drive chain, titable 
solar panels, rechargeable batteries and 
science grade HD cameras. 
 
 Table 4 below provides a list of potential prospecting instruments that may be carried on a lunar rover or lander. 
It is preferable, of course, to be fitted on a rover in order to be able to obtain data at several locations. However, 
these instruments may also be fitted on a lunar hopper or other type of lander. These instruments vary in size and 
mass, ranging from 1 to 6 kg, and can be modified to fit within the payload volume of some of the lunar rovers listed 
in table 3. Although the rovers and instruments are small systems, they can provide valuable data to help identify 
where areas of high concentration of water-ice deposits and other volatiles exist.  
   Table 4. Potential Resource Prospecting Instruments and Equipment 
Instrumentation Options Capabilities 
Neutron Spectrometer System 
(NSS) 
Senses hydrogen-bearing materials (eg. Ice) in the 
top meter of regolith. 
Near-Infrared Volatile 
Spectrometer System (NIRVSS)  
Identifies volatiles, including water form (e.g. ice 
bound) in top 20-30 cm of regolith. Also provides 
surface temperatures at scales of <10 m 
Camera, LEDs plus NIR 
spectrometer 
Provides high fidelity spectral composition at 
range. 
Drills Captures samples from up to 1 m; provides more 
accurate strength measurement of subsurface. 
 










III. Lunar Industrialization Planning 
Lunar industrialization planning is not a new concept. There have been numerous studies29,30,31,32,33,34 since the 
1950’s to present time, investigating potential lunar industries that may yield economic benefits and value to Earth 
inhabitants and/or future lunar dwellers. These industries range from lunar mining, manufacturing, propellant 
production, power stations, helium-3 production, communication satellites, lunar rovers, lunar habitats to lunar 
tourism. Although there have been several market studies35 conducted that show promising projections of lunar 
markets and revenue streams, there is no stand-alone business plan to date that makes a compelling enough case to 
its investors to ensure a profitable return on investment within a reasonable time frame. The challenge to these 
businesses is the large size of investments needed upfront to put in place all the elements of the infrastructure needed 
to make their business plans successful. This is where government can help to offset this economic burden from the 
individual businesses and help with the development of the infrastructure. As shown from industrialization efforts of 
the past, government can be a catalyst to lunar industrialization by partnering with industry to build the 
infrastructure needed for new lunar businesses to succed and a new space economy to flourish. Some of the elements 
of this infrastructure has already been discussed, such as, lunar transportation, power stations, communication 
satellites and resource prospecting. Other elements may include landing pads, navigation systems, human habitats 
and surface transportation and communication systems. All of these elements do not have to be put in place at once. 
This should be a gradual development in partnership with industry to meet both NASA’s and industry’s needs. This 
infrastructure development will not only help accelerate the emergence of lunar industries but it will also provide 
extensive benefits to NASA and our nation by lowering infrastructure costs and addressing some of our nation’s 
critical problems, such as, climate change, resource depletion, energy independence, etc.  
One very important infrastructure element needed for all emerging industries are power stations. There are 
several options for power stations including solar power systems, nuclear power systems and power beaming from 
solar satellites. The lunar surface presents several challenges to development of power stations including long night 
time periods of 14 Earth days where no sunlight is available at equatorial locations. For solar power systems, this 
challenge requires long-term energy storage systems or high tower power stations installed on a mountain or at high 
elevations in the polar regions. To overcome the long lunar nights, nuclear power stations may be preferable but also 
present many other challenges such as potential radiation hazards to humans and equipment as well as safety and 
environmental concerns on launch. Solar power satellites are also an attractive solution since they can be placed in 
high orbits to collect continuous solar energy. However power beaming to a ground station is in its early conceptual 
stages and may require a long development time before being fully operational. All of these options will require 
some development time to overcome its challenges. To accelerate this development, it will be advantageous for 
NASA to partner with industry to develop and demonstrate these power and storage capabilities using the COTS 
model. Once these capabilities have been developed, new lunar power industries will emerge ready and capable to 
provide its power services at cost to its customers including NASA and other government agencies. Similarly, lunar 
communications relay satellites should be developed as well using the COTS model to incentivize industry to 
develop these capabilities to provide future communication services from Earth to various sites on the Moon. 
Although government does play an important role in building an infrastructure on the Moon as discussed, 
industry should take the lead in conducting its lunar missions to determine which other industries are economically 
viable enough for them to pursue. One example of a potentially economically viable business plan is mining 
platinum group metals (PGMs), such as platinum, iridium, osmium, rhodium, and palladium. Wingo31 describes a 
hydrogen economy which revolves around replacing combustion engines with hydrogen fuel cells to power 
automobiles. Hydrogen fuel cells are much more efficient than combustion engines as well as hybrid engines. 
However, fuel cell efficiencies are highly variable depending on the fuel source (hydrogen vs. hydrocarbons) and 
catalyst (platinum). The real advantage of using fuel cells over combustion engines are in their low level of 
pollutants exhausted as compared to combustion engines. In a hydrogen fuel cell, the only output is pure water. 
Therefore it may be advantageous to use hydrogen fuel cells for rovers and other machinery to be operated on the 
lunar surface which can be fueled by resources found on the Moon. This advancement in fuel cell technology can 
also provide benefits to the automotive and other industries on Earth to help accelerate the growth and use of 
hydrogen fuel cells.  
Another good example of a successful lunar industry is creating propellant, such as LO2 and LH2, on the Moon. 
The Evolvable Lunar Architecture (ELA) study, as described in reference XX, presented an affordable and 
economical plan for establishing a permanent commercial lunar base that can create and deliver up to 200 mt of 
propellant per year to cis-lunar space for a total estimated development cost of $40B over a 10-12 year period. If this 
plan is realized and lunar-derived propellant can be produced and delivered at economical rates, then this will have a 
dramatic impact to future human Mars mission concepts as the initial mass to LEO without the propellant will be 
 




significantly reduced as well as the required number of heavy-lift launches, making future Mars concepts more 
affordable. However, more economic assessments are needed to refine the estimates of how much it will cost to 
create an ISRU facility to create the propellant and deliver to a cis-lunar propellant depot. The next section describes 
a preliminary life-cycle cost and economic assessment to refine these estimates to understand the risks and potential 
benefits from this lunar industry. 
IV. Preliminary Life Cycle Cost and Economic Assessment 
Life cycle cost and/or economic assessment for the case of extracting lunar resources, creating lunar-derived 
propellant, delivering to a cis-lunar depot, and transferring the propellant to some customer presents an assortment 
of challenges. Prior work20,36 generally develops an architecture for which costs are estimated, consisting of a launch 
vehicle, spacecraft, landers, or even a lunar ISRU’s conceptual layout.37 Given the diverse subject matter expertise 
required across all elements of an architecture, from specific launchers to specific ISRU chemistry, cost estimates 
will suffer from a long list of uncertainties. For example, using the NASA Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM) can 
provide a cost estimate for a space system element in idealized circumstances, but it may not provide a realistic cost 
estimate in actual circumstances, where the realistic estimate can be multiples of the ideal. Similarly, an analysis 
developed by subject matter experts in one part of the architecture may not fully appreciate the way costs will 
realistically behave in another part of the architecture. 
With this background in mind, the following is a preliminary, new approach in developing a life cycle cost 
and/or economic assessment for using lunar resources, especially lowering cost risk. First, it should not be assumed 
that government will provide all the infrastructure needed as previously discussed. A more consistent picture 
assumes lunar resources as a cost to a customer, any customer, at a delivery interface, making no further claim. 
Having purchased a truck, or just a ride, it is not a requirement that a customer must also own and operate the gas 
station. Second, and similarly, non-government customers will be treated the same as government customers where 
neither owns the lunar resource capability. It should be assumed that a third-party entity with private investment will 
provide the lunar resource capability, such as lunar-derived propellant. This in turn means any cost estimates for 
using lunar resources would be cost estimates in a commercial paradigm, as with the Commercial Cargo or Crew 
programs supporting the ISS. 
To make the ISRU business case assessment much more manageable, Figure 2 (1) shows an approach 
separating the more definable from the more uncertain, (2) introduces a “price point” from which more definable 
costs can “bound” the ISRU challenge, and (3) separates the lunar resource customer from the ISRU business. The 
basic idea behind Figure X will be familiar to anyone who has ever thought about the business, economic or 
budgetary feasibility of a concept by asking - “what if all of these items are free, but not that – then what would that 
still add up to”? 
Consistent with the LCOTS concept, costs estimates for the elements involved in providing transfer services in 
Figure X (in this scenario - propellant delivery in lunar orbit) start with recent experience in the NASA Commercial 
Cargo and Crew programsxix. An initial estimate is how NASA would assist in developing elements in Figure X on a 
commercial basis. With NASA as a zero-equity investor, and private capital investment incentives aligned to 
succeed, costs for these elements on a commercial basis drop dramatically while preserving a credible basis of 
estimate and lowering cost risk. 
“Cost baseball cards” (Figure 3) of numerous space system elements are being developed along this line of 
reasoning, addressing assorted scales of elements and assorted acquisition approaches, cost-plus or commercial. 
From this, assorted options for elements in the “more definable” category of Figure 2 help define that ISRU 
investment challenge which would remain – all investments that could be part government, part private. 
Preliminary results for In-space Stages (Figure 3) as well as Landers, all of assorted scale and acquisition 
approach, show great promise toward closing a lunar ISRU investment case. The critical parameters after the more 
definable costs of in-space stages, landers, etc. are (1) the price point for delivered propellant at the interface to the 
customer and (2) the scope of the surface facility, the ISRU challenge. 
The price-point is that cost per kg for usable commodities that a customer (like NASA or others) would pay 
having gotten as far as reaching some location in lunar space. For example, IF the Price Point is $5,000 per kg, paid 
for delivered commodity in lunar orbit, and IF “more definable” costs (lunar orbit storage, transport, etc. Figure X) 
are $2,000/kg, THEN the ISRU “challenge” is to not add more than about $5,000 minus $2,000 = $3,000 costs per 
kg of revenue generating commodity. 
 
                                                            
xix The successful experience of NASA with the commercially developed SpaceHab, among other examples, also applies. 
 











Figure 3 Unlike Element Performance Baseball Cards with features and mass statements, the Element Cost 
Baseball Card here assists with life cycle cost and economic assessment, without which elements may be imagined, 
but never achieved, having neglected establishing a proper business case. 
 
The prior would require leaving room for profit, financial factors, a valuation perspective, etc. Preliminary 
results show promise in these business cases, depending especially on the factors that tell how technically reusable 
the assets placed once into service actually prove to be. A storage location (depot, hub, etc.), transports/landers for 
taking propellant from the moon to the storage node, and the associated space operations and traffic management, 
are at the end of day all reusable assets competing against expendable alternatives. The expendable alternatives 
would be customers with more and/or larger stages/systems, more assortment of stage sizes, more launches of all of 
2
Description	  of	  Basis	  of	  Estimate	  for	  Development	  &	  Manufacturing	  Costs:
Cost	  estimating	  relationships	  combine	  older	  and	  recent	  historical	  data	  using	  the	  acquisition	  
approach	  indicated	  (cost-­‐plus	  or	  commercial).
Estimates	  with	  a	  commercial	  acquisition	  basis DO include	  ground	  and	  flight	  ops	  development	  
within	  their	  development	  estimates,	  and	  ground	  and	  launch	  within	  their	  per	  unit	  estimates.
Estimates	  with	  a	  cost-­‐plus	  acquisition	  basis (the	  EUS)	  do	  NOT include	  ground	  and	  flight	  ops	  
development	  within	  their	  development	  estimates,	  nor	  ground	  and	  launch	  within	  their	  per	  unit	  
estimates.	  
For	  all	  estimates,	  additional	  costs	  must	  be	  added	  for	  further	  in-­‐space	  operations	  /	  mission	  
operations	  such	  as	  rendezvous,	  mate,	  transfer	  of	  propellant,	  station	  keeping,	  etc.	  as	  apply.
Notes:
1. All	  estimates	  are	  for	  one	  provider	  scenarios.
2. Rate	  production	  is	  low.
In-­‐space	  Stages
Delta	  IV	  5m	  Upper	  Stage










Per	  Unit	  Incl.	  
Launch	  $M	  
2016	  $ Prop,	  kg
Tanker	  LO/LH for	  
Falcon	  Heavy,	  as	  3rd	  
stage,	  as	  payload
6,182 Commercial $174 $34 48,218
Tanker	  LO/LH for	  
Falcon	  Heavy,	  
replacing	  2nd	  stage	  +	  
payload
17,157 Commercial $481 $94 133,813
Tanker	  LO/LH for	  
Delta	  IV	  Heavy,	  as	  
3rd	  stage,	  as	  payload
3,272 Commercial $92 $18 25,518
Tanker	  LO/LH for	  
Delta	  IV	  Heavy,	  
replacing	  2nd	  stage	  +	  
payload
6,762 Commercial $190 $37 52,738
Stage	  LO/LH,	  Smaller
11,002 Commercial $247 $48 100,000
Stage	  LO/LH,	  Smaller
11,002 Commercial $324 $46 100,000
Depot	  LO/LH,	  
Smaller 11,002 Commercial $1,216 $174 100,000
EUS	  for	  SLS,	  LO/LH
11,854 Cost-­‐plus	  and	  sole	  source $3,493 $249 107,328
Stage	  LO/LH,	   Larger
18,252 Commercial $410 $80 225,000
Stage	  LO/LH,	   Larger
18,252 Commercial $538 $77 225,000
Depot	  LO/LH,	  Larger








• Commitment	  to	  
Services
• Firm	  Fixed	  Price
• Government	  as	  
one	  of	  Many	  
Customers










this, with surge concepts, etc. all using this hardware once, discarding it all, and building it all anew for the next go-
round. Vertical vs. horizontal business integration concepts also compete (for example, the propellant storage site in 
lunar orbit may be a company entity un-related to the surface facility). 
As this work continues, it will add more detail to the work to date, continuing to assess portions of the ISRU 
investment question in this systematic approach. This more manageable LCOTS approach to a life cycle cost and 
economic assessment provides for a credible basis of estimates, and significantly more affordable elements of an 
ISRU system of systems, from a customer and from a public and private investment point of view. Consistent with 
NASA’s experience in public private partnerships, technical challenges will see unexpected innovation. As well, the 
overall business case improves with one essential ingredient - having the government be one customer of many, 
alongside private sector business cases and operations. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, an update to the Lunar COTS plan was provided outlining a new campaign of low-cost, 
commercial-enabled missions to prospect for resources, determine the economic viability of extracting those 
resources and assess the value proposition of using these resources in future exploration architectures such as Mars 
architectures. A Space Development framework was also presented that stressed the importance of an Economic 
Development phase where the missions are focused primarily on spurring economic growth in space and providing 
economic benefit to the space community. With these principles in mind,  new economic goals for Phase I of Lunar 
COTS were presented which included: 
1. Conduct a campaign of low-cost, commercial-enabled lunar exploration missions to prospect and 
extract lunar resources to meet NASA’s mission needs and industry’s commercial interests; 
2. Determine the economic viability of extracting resources by testing various commercial tools, products 
and techniques in a lunar environment; 
3. Build an economic infrastructure by partnering with industry to place in service power stations, lunar 
communication relay satellites and lunar surface communication systems; 
4. Enable a robust cis-lunar commercial economy by incentivizing industry to create new space products 
and markets; 
5. Inspire the next generation of space entrepreneurs by conducting several educational and outreach 
activities. 
 To meet these goals, a three-phased approach was described to develop and demonstrate cis-lunar capabilities 
and services by partnering with industry to share cost and risk for mutual benefit using the well-proven COTS 
acquisition model. These capabilities and services needed to accomplish the Lunar COTS goals were also described 
which included launch vehicles, lunar landers, lunar rovers, resource prospecting instruments, power stations and 
lunar relay communication satellites. A partnership strategy to develop these capabilities and services was also 
described along with the infrastructure needed to accomplish these goals. Development of these cost-effective 
services would not only enable NASA to economically and sustainably achieve its human exploration missions to 
the Moon, Mars and beyond but it would also kickstart a new era of lunar industrialization. 
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